The unexpected, but not entirely surprising, transfer of Dallas coadjutor bishop Joseph Galante to the diocese of Camden NJ brings to a quiet close a strange interlude in American episcopal history. Strange, because coadjutor bishops are supposed to take over the see for which they were appointed (1983 CIC 403 § 3). That's the whole point in naming them in the first place and for distinguishing them from auxiliary bishops. Moreover, to facilitate the intended transition, while awaiting succession coadjutors are supposed to be appointed vicar general (basically, the No. 2 position in a diocese, 1983 CIC 406 § 1).

            For these reasons, coadjutor bishops tend not to be appointed unless the current bishop has resigned or soon will resign his office (his reasons for resigning not being important). But since late 1999 when Bp. Galante was first made the Dallas coadjutor, there has been considerable "back-and-forth" about when, and even whether, current Dallas Bp. Charles Grahmann (who does not reach retirement age until July 2006)  would resign. Nor does it appear that Bp. Galante was appointed vicar general in the meantime. As I say, strange.

Now, it's not as if things have been quiet in Dallas for the last several years, suggesting less need to be concerned about what some might dismiss as the niceties of episcopal protocol. To the contrary, to pick just one notorious example, the Diocese of Dallas under Bp. Grahmann has been host to one of the worst (in part because much of it occurred recently) clergy sexual misconduct cases in the country (the Kos case, since jailed and laicized), and was hit with one of the largest jury verdicts in history.

So one is left wondering, why was Bp. Galante, a man of obvious talent and credentials, appointed as Dallas coadjutor, if not to take over in fairly short order? Did Bp. Grahmann signal his willingness to resign five years ago, and then change his mind? If so, why? And what, finally, might this say about the other (currently four) coadjutor appointments in the US?     

To the last question, I can suggest an answer: not much. It takes two points to establish a line, so unless another American coadjutor is suddenly pulled from his intended see, one should probably regard Bp. Galante’s transfer as just another oddity associated with the Dallas situation, and not as signaling a Roman rethinking of the valuable office of coadjutor. +++

Happy Solemnity of the Annunciation, everybody! (PS: Please add my name to the list of those who think that crisis of abortionism --here, and around the world-- warrants the Church's raising this magnificent day to the rank of Holy Day of Obligation (1983 CIC 1244).

I’m not adverse to holding others to a high standard of accuracy, so I should not hesitate to hold myself to the same norm.

In an interesting article on annulments for the National Catholic Register (14-20 March 2004, pp. 1, 12) for which I was an identified source, Pat Novecosky writes: “The dramatic increase [in annulments] is based on [various] factors, Peters said.” So far, so good. Sounds like something I'd say (indeed, have said, many times.) But next comes, “Procedural changes in canon law—including a new emphasis on psychological factors—make it easier to prove a marriage null.” Hmm.

First, I hope I didn’t say that “emphasis on psychological factors” (referring to Canon 1095) was a procedural change in canon law. Obviously, Canon 1095 is a substantive canon, not a procedural one, a distinction I regularly explain to interested inquirers, albeit with mixed results. In any case, blurring these two categories would be sloppy thinking coming from a canonist.

More worrisome, though, is the possibility that I might have said it’s now “easier to prove a marriage null.” Instead, I thought I said it’s “easier to prove an invalid marriage null.” There's a subtle but important difference between the two statements. The first (while defensible and sometimes used by trustworthy ecclesiastics) can lend unwitting support to a casual-divorce-and-easy-annulment mentality, while the second squarely aligns one with Cardinal Ratzinger and his September 1994 Letter on Eucharistic reception by the divorce-and-remarried (esp. ¶ 9). Personally, I am more comfortable agreeing with Cardinal Ratzinger than with seeming, perhaps, to have caved into the divorce mentality.

Now admittedly, if I were critiquing someone else I’d hasten to add that, given the complexity of the subject matter and the occasional technical inexpertise of busy journalists, perhaps the expert, despite having actually said what he certainly thought he said, had simply been misunderstood or somehow had questionable positions mistakenly attributed to him. But, while extending him the benefit of the doubt, I’d still encourage his setting the record straight. Accuracy on these things is important. +++

Circumstances usually make it too difficult to answer individual questions in a blog format, but Mark Brumley has raised a good one:

            Ed, I just read a Q & A concerning the point at which during the Mass one arrives too late lawfully to receive Communion.  The answer raised a number of issues with me, issues which I anticipate others may have concerns about as well.  First, what does the Church require in the matter?  Second, shouldn't the issues of conditions for receiving Communion under be distinguished from the conditions for fulfilling one's Sunday obligation?  I appreciate what the respondent was attempting, but it seems to me that his answer was problematic.  Perhaps it would be helpful if you were to address the matter on your blog.  I would have interest in linking to it on mine. Thanks. Mark.

In pertinent part, the Q & A Mark refers to reads as follows: 

Question: At what point in time during Mass is it considered too late for anyone coming into the Mass to receive Communion? These days I see a lot of people who enter the Mass even as Communion is being given and they head straight to receive. Is this right?

Answer: Like most priests, I am loath to give a straight answer to this question because, in a way, it is a catch-22 question for which there is no right answer. … Although I prefer not to hazard giving a precise cutoff moment, certainly someone who arrives after the consecration has not attended Mass, should not receive Communion, and if it is a Sunday, go to another Mass.

I think this answer is wrong in several respects and I will offer below what I think is the correct reply. But the answer also underscores the importance of two important obligations that fall on those of us privileged to be approached by the faithful with questions.

First obligation: Answer correctly the question posed. Here, the question posed was “At what point in time during Mass is it considered too late for anyone coming into the Mass to receive Communion?” The correct answer is that one’s eligibility for Communion is not determined by the time of one’s arrival at Mass. A Catholic who is not conscious of being in grave sin (cc. 915-916), has fasted for an hour (c. 919), seeks the sacrament at a reasonable time (c. 843), and has not already received (c. 917), is eligible for Communion (c. 844). To state that anyone who arrives late to Mass, even “after the consecration," may not receive Communion is simply wrong. No provision of Church law supports such a position. Indeed, it runs afoul of several canons upholding the faithful’s fundamental right to the Eucharist (cc. 213, 912) and leads people to assess inaccurately (perhaps embarrassingly so) the eligibility of others to participate in the Eucharist. 

But, then to go on and answer additionally that such a person needs to go to another Sunday Mass thoroughly confuses the question posed with one not actually asked, and that in turn leads us to another obligation.

Second obligation: Help the questioner ask the question he might, or also, want answered. Here, the questioner might (I say might, as there is no evidence of this in the question itself) have wanted to know “How much of Mass can be missed before one cannot be said to have satisfied the Sunday obligation?” A very different question indeed. In response, one should help the questioner see first that the Sunday obligation is not a Communion reception obligation at all, and that receiving Communion no more fulfills the Sunday obligation than not receiving Communion means one has not fulfilled the Sunday obligation. Once that distinction is clear, helping the questioner avoid more legalistic descriptions of the Sunday obligation is easier, the unity of the entire Eucharistic celebration can be stressed, and the importance of being present at and participating in the whole liturgy is more obvious. To the insistent questioner still demanding to know just how late one can be and still have it count, one must simply reply “The Legislator (Pope) has not told us how much of Mass one may miss under what conditions and still have it count toward one’s Sunday obligation, but this much is clear: if you arrive during, let alone after, the Entrance Rites, you are late, and you may be sure that you’ll being taking up your reason for being late with God at Final Judgment." Finally, the blanket assertion that "certainly ... someone who arrives after the consecration ... should go to another [Sunday] Mass" also needed, but unfortunately did not receive, some important nuances and qualifications. But enough of this.

It is not easy to avoid morphing questions we are asked into those we thought we were asked, or even into those we think we should have been asked, but that’s our duty as experts in canon law, liturgy, theology, and so on, to say nothing of our responsibility to get the answers right. If I react thus when I see a fellow seemingly commit these errors, it’s only because I bear the regret of having committed similar ones myself and hope others can avoid my mistakes. +++

Considering only, for example, how much of the recent clergy scandals in the USA can be traced to ignorance of, or disregard for, canonical directives in Church life, it's good to see Rome taking positive steps to augment the expertise of those who will be increasingly called upon to advise bishops and others on the juridical aspects of ecclesiastical ministries and apostolates. But these are only steps and more remains to be done to increase the vital professionalism of modern canon law. I’ll be addressing those points in due course.+++

The revised norms for handling allegations of clerical sexual misconduct are out, and while, strictly speaking, they still require approval from the USCCB and, once more even, from Rome itself, there is little doubt but that both ratifications will be secured promptly. Predictably, some are presenting the revised norms as virtual endorsements of the USCCB’s summer proposals, while some, conceivably, would like to cast the new norms as a trouncing of the bishops efforts. As usual, neither extreme interpretation is accurate.

As I had hoped, the bishops’ excellent Preamble remained virtually intact. Deftly, however, Rome chose the Preamble to insert a badly needed clarification as to what legally constituted the sexual abuse of minors (i.e., “an external, objectively grave violation of the Sixth Commandment”), thus remedying one the weakest parts of the bishops’ summer efforts.

The bishops’ call for all dioceses to file policies on sexual misconduct with the USCCB has been retained, but the revised norms now explicitly demand that such policies honor the requirements of procedural canon law (e.g., Canons 1717-1719).

The bishops’ plans to have outside boards conduct the canonically mandated investigations of clergy sexual abuse allegations has been rejected by Rome; such boards now merely advise bishops on what was, all along, their responsibility. Rome has also insisted that all the members of this board be Catholic (pace the USCCB’s press release on this point) albeit persons financially independent of the Church. In both respects these are major improvements over the original proposals.

The so-called “appellate review boards” are completely gone, saving the Church and the people she serves the confusion of a whole parallel system of institutions for dealing with just one kind of case. And the earlier skimpy outline of investigation procedures has been considerably beefed up by express references to various relevant canons that, all along, have been in force, waiting to be applied. Importantly, Rome has reiterated the rights of the accused not to be subjected to involuntary psychological investigation, I hope once and for all.

Both versions of the norms recognize that for even a single act of child sexual abuse an offending cleric will be removed permanently from ministry. Amen to that, especially now that the working definition of child sexual abuse is much less subjective than was earlier envisioned.

Two new and important provisions inserted by Rome remind bishops that 1) they already have what canonists call “executive power of governance” enabling them to deal promptly with potential abuse situations not immediately addressed by criminal canon law, and 2) that bishops can request from Rome, even without the cooperation or consent of the cleric in question, what is termed an ex officio dismissal from the clerical state for offensive behavior. It is, I suggest, another quiet affirmation that canon law was not lacking as this crisis mounted, it more often was simply not being applied.

We can leave to others the interesting, if largely irrelevant, question as to the degree to which the revised norms should be seen as endorsing the bishops’ original proposals from this summer. One’s time is better spent, I suggest, in identifying any possible remaining weaknesses in the policies (there are some, I think), and then getting about the task of protecting children from sexual predators among the clergy. +++

The four American prelates who worked with Roman officials to obtain a significantly improved 

procedure for dealing with the crisis of clergy sexual misconduct with children. 

The Vatican is about to reject, at least in substantial part, the USCCB’s novel proposals for dealing with the clerical sexual abuse of minors crisis. This is good news.

Except for its Preamble (which reads quite well, I think), almost the whole of the rest of the June 14th document was problematic. It failed to define terms, it ignored whole stretches of canonical criminal procedure, and, though billed as the charter for episcopal responsibility, it actually removed from bishops considerable authority for responding to these cases (on the Church’s behalf, no less) and delivered it to quasi-independent committees, themselves only vaguely configured.

Update: (18 October): "When it comes to beating the Catholic Church", said G. K. Chesterton, "any stick will do." It's already started:

Hostile critics are charging the Vatican with everything from stupid curial blindness, to clerical wagon-circling, to an out-and-out cover-up, based on its rejection, for the most part, of the USCCB's proposed norms on clerical sexual misconduct. In reality, though, the Vatican wants bishops, not vaguely described committees, to take real responsibility for supervising Catholic clergy and allegations of misconduct; it wants canon law to be applied fairly and vigorously against such dangers, and will not countenance resort to ill-defined policies thrown together under media spot lights; and it even dares to suggest that in the flood of verified allegations of disgusting clerical misconduct, there are at least a few innocent priests (and others) who are being railroaded by the same disrespect for fundamental legal procedures that helped get us into this horrible mess in the first place.

A considerable number of the men who actually created this crisis, whether they be priests who engaged in gravely illicit behavior, bishops who did not recognize or did not act on that information, or some advisors who helped shape an attitude of neglect, are now gone from the scene, leaving others behind to clean up their mess. The lack of credibility that current committed Catholic leadership has on this topic is the price it has to pay for other's mistakes. So be it. Time and again the Church has experienced the pain of having wandered from its own published principles and the solution was rarely found in the concoction of new structures, committees, position papers, charters, and what have you, but rather the humble return to the perennial principles of sound moral, pastoral, and canonical wisdom.+++

            Specifically, the United Stated Conference of Catholic Bishops (the recently reorganized USCCB) would have almost complete agenda-making and conduct-governing authority over a national plenary council (c. 441). But this is the same conference on whose watch the clergy misconduct crisis has festered for years. Its efforts to address priestly misconduct (and there have been some efforts, to be sure) have not generally been such as to inspire confidence among the faithful yet.

            One might counter that, at least in part, some of the bishops who made up the conference in years past (when little was being done nationally to check priestly misbehavior) have since retired, leaving relatively more influence to recent appointees. These, there is reason to hope, seem more willing to confront criminal behavior in the ranks of their priests. Ah, but this raises a second concern, namely, that the conference is empowered to invite even retired bishops to a plenary council, which in turn would be required to give them a deliberative vote (c. 443 § 2). Such an action would dilute the influence of exactly those newer bishops whose voices most need to be heard.

            A plenary council, if one is held, should limit its agenda to the topic of clergy sexual misconduct and only active bishops who have to face the crisis here and now should be invited with a deliberative vote. Finally, the Holy See needs to communicate that it is truly ready and willing to reject any legislation that might be inconsistent with genuine Catholic character (c. 446). +++

Update, November 10: The November issue of Catholic World Report, pp. 32-33, features opinions from several prominent US Catholic observers on the advisability of convoking a Plenary Council for America.

If all things were equal—and they never are—but if all things were equal, I would prefer to see people receive Holy Communion standing. I personally like the symbolism of those who have been raised to new life in Christ receiving Him standing, as was done in the early Church. But this “ancient practice” argument cannot be pressed very far, at least not unless one is also willing to go back, say, to seven-years-on-bread-and-water penances. The selectivity of those who argue for the return of some ancient practices while avoiding, if not vetting, others, borders on the hypocritical.

If nothing else, the timing of this change is wrong. Instead of removing a traditional sign of belief in the Eucharist at the very time when most studies show Catholic belief in that mystery to be at modern lows, we should welcome a reasonable and popular gesture of faith in the Blessed Sacrament. Finally, if a change in discipline does come, it would be nice if, for a change, it were not sprung on loyal but bewildered Catholics who have been encouraged in one practice for years, only to be chastised for not reading the latest liturgical tea leaves quickly enough to suit the makers of liturgical morals. The faithful deserve some pastoral preparation. +++

But it has no foundation in a canon law system that only recognizes only outright resignation from episcopal office (c. 401) or, more rarely, a declaration that a see has been “impeded” (c. 412) by conditions clearly not satisfied under the present circumstances. As archbishop, moreover, Dr. Pell could not have used his powers to interfere with various investigations that were being conducted independently of his office in the first place. His action therefore, already extra legem (outside the law, but not exactly contrary to it), accomplishes little concrete in the order of procedures.

What it does do, I am afraid, is to establish a dangerous precedent or “unwritten expectation” for others. If a man as upright and as innocent as (I believe) Archbishop Pell is will surrender high ecclesiastical office for an extended period of time on the flimsiest of accusations, what is to prevent every bishop, not to mention clerics or lay workers, from being held to that same unreasonable standard, especially given that few accusations are likely to be as obviously worthless as are those under which Archbishop Pell labors. Will not such expectations of “temporary resignations” now be demanded by every enemy of the Church who wants to gum up its administrative and pastoral life? Moreover, should Archbishop Pell now order, or even allow, one of his own faithful pastors or lay workers to drop his duties to Christ and His people in response to accusations that the archbishop himself might be certain are false? If so, at what point exactly does an investigation into these sorts of accusations end? This is far from clear, leaving the terminus of such an anomalous situation helplessly up in the air. If nothing else, these are some of the questions that need to be addressed before concluding in favor of the archbishop’s action. +++

Update 2: As of the 15th of October, an independent inquiry being unable to substantiate any of the accusations made against Abp. Pell, he has resumed his duties. Deo gratias. +++

Prof. Rev. Gianfranco Ghirlanda, SJ, distinguished dean of the canon law faculty at Rome’s influential Gregorian University, is reported to have said recently “From a canon law perspective, the bishop and the [religious] superior are neither morally nor judicially responsible for the acts committed by one of their clergy.” (Assoc. Press, 18 May 2002, article by Tom Rachman).  

Perhaps Professor Ghirlanda was misquoted or his remarks taken out of context. In any case, the claim that bishops and religious superiors are neither morally nor judicially responsible for acts of their clergy seems difficult to reconcile with Canon 128 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law that states: “Whoever unlawfully causes harm to another by a juridical act, or indeed by any other act which is deceitful or culpable (actu dolo vel culpa posito), is obliged to repair the damage done. (British trans.)” The Americans render the operative phrase “with malice or negligence”. Either way, the canon (one, incidentally, that greatly expands the scope of ecclesiastical liability for malfeasance in office over its 1917 Code counterpart, Canon 1681) is a clear enunciation of the obligation of persons in the Church (there being no exemption for bishops in this regard) to make good harms unlawfully caused as a result of their actions or omissions.  

The pertinent claim is that the some bishops (not all, but at least some) placed priests known to them to be pederasts or homosexually active in positions wherein they could and did sexually abuse minors. A man who knows his hound snaps at children must not allow such an animal to run free through the neighborhood. If he does so, and if a child is bitten by such a dog, the owner, I suggest, is morally and juridically liable not for biting children himself, obviously, but for knowingly allowing a situation to arise wherein children could predictably be bitten by his dog. The same would seem to apply to bishops who knowingly assigned to parish ministry priests with a known proclivity to toward sex with minors.

If that analogy limps in some ways (e.g., dogs don’t have free will, but priests do), consider the case of one man who freely lends his automobile to another despite knowing that the other is a reckless driver. The owner’s good driving record is not at issue when the other man causes a tragic accident, but his prudence in helping to make possible the crash by enabling the reckless man to have access to a car, is.

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